We design and estimate a game theoretic congestion pricing mechanism in which the regulator aims at reducing traffic congestion by discriminating travelers according to their willingness to travel on the network. He knows that travelers learn about their environment, that their preferences are affected by the reputation of each available mode of transportation and that congestion can be seen as a Bayesian game in which travelers impose externalities on each other. We derive individual optimal fares depending on each traveler's valuation of transportation. Welfare simulation results based on a French household survey show that the travelers' perception of the mode of transportation and income sensitivity differences are important determinants of welfare improvement.

We study the effects of a statutory wage tax sharing rule in a principal - agent framework with moral hazard (à la Holmstrom, 1979) using the approach of Bose, Pal, Sappington (2007) to model the stochastic relationship between the agent’s unobserved effort and his observed performance. The analysis indicates that tax sharing with positive legislated contributions from both the employer and employee does not maximize any of the outcomes -- employee effort, wages, profits or welfare. Moreover, a rule which specifies a corner solution, with 100% of the tax statutorily levied on the employer will maximize effort, expected profit and expected welfare while 100% of the tax statutorily levied on the employee will maximize expected wages.

We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou--Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan--Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a more general construction of revealing choice maps we develop an algorithm to solve rather complex matching problems. The flexibility and efficiency of our approach is illustrated by various examples. We also revisit the mathematical structure of the matching theory by comparing various definitions of stable sets and various classes of choice maps. We demonstrate, by several examples, that the revealing property of the choice maps is the most suitable one to ensure the existence of stable matchings; both from the theoretical and the practical point of view.

Between the latter nineteenth century and the 1930s there was a dramatic revolution in American families. Family size continued its long-term decline, the schooling of older children expanded dramatically and the proportion of married females' adulthood devoted to market-oriented activities increased. Over this same period there were significant reductions in mortality, especially among the young, and impressive reductions in morbidity. This paper considers all these trends jointly, modeling the changes in fertility, child schooling and lifetime married female labor supply as a consequence of exogenous changes in health. These interactions are then quantified using calibration techniques. The simulations suggest that reductions in child mortality alone cannot explain the transformation of the American family. Indeed, in our preferred calibration, reductions in child mortality lead to a modest decline in human capital and increase in fertility, with little effect on married female labor force involvement. In sharp contrast, reductions in morbidity are found to lower fertility and increase education. The time savings from lower fertility more than offset the increased time mothers invest in their childrens' quality, freeing some time for market work. However, lower fertility alone cannot account for the increase in market work of married women. In our framework, the majority of the increase is a consequence of a narrowing of the gender wage gap. More generally, viewing the implications of health improvements deepens our understanding of the American family transformation, complementing explanations based on skill biased technical change and improvements in household durable goods.

The relationship linking skills that are job specific to turnover decisions has long been considered an important issue in the economics of labor mobility. In this paper, we undertake a structural approach and extend the model of Miller (1984) to account for occupational experience as an additional determinant of turnover decision. We construct a dynamic index of individual decision regarding both jobs and occupational switches. More precisely, the return to a particular job (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) depends on both a job match specific parameter and an occupation specific parameter. This allows us to investigate whether the optimal individual decisions of switching jobs changes when accounting for transferable experience of the occupation, which in turn implies that the individual updates beliefs every time period. We use NLSY data to estimate the underlying structural parameters, giving an estimate of the career profile of individuals according to their socioeconomic characteristics.